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During the 1970s and 1980s, American legislators claimed
that they were repudiating the principle of rehabilitating
prisoners. Their stance was based primarily on moral, or
conceptual, grounds. The purposes of prison, they declared, were
just deserts and incapacitation-to punish prisoners for the crimes
they committed and to keep them away from society so that they
could not commit any further crimes.' This new attitude was
partially inspired, and partially endorsed, by scholars who
developed concepts such as the justice model of prisons 2 or
humane containment, 3 and by others who emphasized the moral
evils of rehabilitative programs 4 or the moral acceptability of
retribution. 5 Very quickly, rehabilitation became a dirty word in
American corrections, an emblem of the ill-conceived romanticism
of the 1960s, or the morally irresponsible, ultra-leftist idea that
society is the wrongdoer and the criminal is the victim.
Another development often associated with this change in
corrections policy was the social science finding that prison
rehabilitation programs were ineffective. The most influential
piece was the 1974 meta-analysis of 231 studies by Robert
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I want to thank Frank
Zimring for his help with this Essay, and with the subject in general.
1. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 7-9 (1981); Alfred Blumstein, American Prisons in a
Time of Crisis, in THE AMERICAN PRISON: ISSUES IN RESEARCH AND POLICY 13, 13-
18 (Lynne Goodstein & Doris Layton MacKenzie eds., 1989) [hereinafter THE
AMERICAN PRISON].
2. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1979).
3. See generally ROY KING & ROD MORGAN, THE FUTURE OF THE PRISON
SYSTEM (1980).
4. See ALLEN, supra note 1, at'32-60. See generally JESSICA MITFORD, KIND
AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT
(1974).
5. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 83-188 (1997).
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Martinson, whose final conclusion was that "nothing works."6 This
was preceded and followed by a succession of studies that came to
similar conclusions. 7  When so august an institution as the
National Academy of Sciences concurred,8 the policy implications
may have seemed irresistible.
This empirical basis for rejecting rehabilitation has been
substantially eroded in recent years,9 and this has led to a
counterattack against the critics of rehabilitation. This Essay
joins that growing body of literature, but not on the same
empirical grounds. Instead, it addresses the first and primary
reason for the rejection of rehabilitation; that is, the attack on
rehabilitation as a conceptual and moral basis for corrections. In
essence, it argues that we are inevitably committed to the
principle of rehabilitation, regardless of its empirical effectiveness.
Rehabilitation is the central premise of the modern prison as an
institution; we can no more repudiate it than we can repudiate
national defense as the basis for our military forces, or education
as the basis for our schools, or health care as the basis for our
public hospitals. Consequently, the attack on rehabilitation is
essentially incoherent. Rather than representing a conscientious
approach to social policy, it is at best a petulant complaint about
the complexity of modern government, and, at worst, cynical
demagoguery or self-delusion.
Part I of this Essay briefly discusses the origin of the modern
prison and explains that the principle of rehabilitation was an
inherent feature of the institution's conception and design. Parts
II and III discuss two possible alternatives to rehabilitation as a
purpose for prisons-servitude and incapacitation. They conclude
that servitude has been found morally unacceptable by modern
Americans, and that incapacitation is an empty idea with respect
to the design and operation of prisons. Part IV discusses the
current concept of rehabilitation and responds to criticisms of it as
a principle for imprisonment.
6. Robert Martinson, What Works-Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 48 (Spring 1974). For a more complete account of the
research, see generally DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975).
7. See generally James Robinson & Gerald Smith, The Effectiveness of
Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67 (1971). But see Seymour L. Halleck
& Ann D. Witte, Is Rehabilitation Dead?, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 373 (1977) (arguing
against the criticisms of rehabilitation).
8. See generally PANEL ON RESEARCH ON REHABILITATIVE TECHNIQUES, NAT'L
ACAD. OF ScIs., THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS (Lee Sechrest et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS.].
9. See infra notes 67-69.
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I. The Premise of Prisons
As everyone other than Clarence Thomas knows, 0 prisons
did not exist in colonial America." There were prisons in England
as early as the Reformation period, 12 but the institution was not a
common mode of punishment until the very end of the eighteenth
century.'3 This was not because the concept of detention was
absent, nor even because the administrative capacities to operate
detention facilities were lacking. Jails were a well-established
social institution; people were put in jail while they were awaiting
trial, if they failed to pay their debts, or if the King regarded them
as a security threat.' 4  After the ordeal' 5 was abolished in
thirteenth century England, the only way to try most indictments
was by jury, but the accused had to agree to this newly-established
procedure; if he did not, the judge would leave him in jail until he
changed his mind or starved to death.' 6 Despite its important role
in the English judicial system, incarceration was rarely regarded
as a mode of punishment. 17 Once convicted, the serious felon was
generally tortured or put to death.
10. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 39 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(stating that "when members of the founding generation wished to make prison
conditions a matter of constitutional guarantee, they knew how to do so" and citing
a provision regarding jails to support this proposition).
11. For accounts of the development of prisons in America, see BLAKE
MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 6-33 (1977);
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 57-108 (rev. ed. 1990) [hereinafter THE DISCOVERY OF THE
ASYLUM]; see generally David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States,
1789-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 111 (Norval Morris & David J.
Rothman eds., 1995). Colonial-era punishments, consisting of fines, shaming,
branding, exile, and death, are described in LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 34-44 (1993).
12. See Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe, in
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 11, at 49, 67.
13. For the development of prisons in England, see CHRISTOPHER HARDING ET
AL., IMPRISONMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A CONCISE HISTORY (1985); MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION, 1750-1850 (1978); Randall McGowen, The Well-Ordered Prison,
England, 1780-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 11, at 79.
14. See generally J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1600-1800
(1986); HARDING ET AL., supra note 13; see generally Sean McConville, Local
Justice: The Jail, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 11, at 297,
302; Edward Peters, Prison Before the Prison: The Ancient and Medieval Worlds, in
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 11, at 3, 33-36.
15. The ordeal is a means of determining guilt or innocence by submitting the
accused to dangerous or painful tests the result being regarded as a divine
judgment. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 874 (2d ed. 1985).
16. See 1 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 326-27 (7th
ed. 1956).
17. See John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Sanction of
Imprisonment for Serious Crimes, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (Jan. 1976); Peters, supra
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As the eighteenth century progressed, both these penalties
began to offend people's sensibilities. Torture seemed
inappropriately savage for an era that saw itself as enlightened
and humane.'8 The death penalty remained acceptable, but only
for the most serious offenses; for other crimes, it gradually
acquired the same barbarous connotations as torture. 19  The
criminal justice crisis that resulted from these attitudes was
resolved by transportation, first to Georgia, then to Australia. 20
But Georgia freed itself from British jurisdiction in 1776;
subsequently, it received only unconvicted criminals. Australia
remained within the British Empire, but by the early 1800s the
transported criminals formed a civil society, together with other
colonists, and were no longer willing to receive their quondam
colleagues. At the same time, the British government became
concerned that the development of a civil society in Australia had
rendered transportation there more of an opportunity than a
punishment.21 Confronted with a second breakdown in criminal
justice, Britain turned to the penitentiary. The newly-formed
note 14. This is not as true for continental Europe, where imprisonment as a
punishment for crime was more commonly employed. See PIETER SPIERENBURG,
THE PRISON EXPERIENCE: DISCIPLINARY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INMATES IN
EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1991); Spierenburg, supra note 12, at 49.
18. See generally JOHN LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE
AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIENT REGIME (1977); EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE
(expanded ed. 1996); Mirjan Damaska, The Death of Legal Torture, 87 YALE L.J.
860, 864 (1978).
19. The causes of the death penalty's abolition in some jurisdictions, and its
restriction to the most serious offenses in others are complex, but most writers
agree that they had something to do with developing social attitudes and
sensibilities. See, e.g., RICHARD J. EVANS, RITUALS OF RETRIBUTION: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN GERMANY 1600-1987 (1996); V.A.C. GATRELL, THE HANGING TREE:
EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 1770-1868 (1994); Louis P. MASUR, RITES OF
EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
CULTURE 1776-1865 (1989).
20. See generally BEATTIE, supra note 14; A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR
AMERICA: THE TRANSPORTATION OF BRITISH CONVICTS TO THE COLONIES, 1718-1775
(1987); John Hirst, The Australian Experience: The Convict Colony, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 11, at 263; A.G.L. SHAW, CONVICTS AND THE
COLONIES: A STUDY OF PENAL TRANSPORTATION FROM GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
TO AUSTRALIA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE (Melbourne Univ. Press
1977) (1966).
21. See ROBERT HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE 485-580 (1987); Hirst, supra note
20, at 276-79. Cf. CHARLES DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS (Oxford Univ. Press
1970) (1861) (in which Abel Magwitch makes his fortune in Australia after having
been transported there as a convict). In response to these concerns, Britain did not
immediately stop sending convicts to Australia, but it stopped using Australia itself
as repository for felons and established a number of prisons and penal settlements
within Australia, such as Port Arthur, Port Macquarie, Moreton Bay, and Norfolk
Island (the last a South Pacific Island, but within Australia's jurisdiction). This
practice was no longer considered transportation per se, but imprisonment at a
remote location.
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United States, seeking a mode of punishment that would conform
with its revolutionary ideals, began developing penitentiaries as
well. 22
From its outset, the penitentiary was conceived as a means of
rehabilitation. This was the rationale for relying on confinement,
instead of the more familiar sanctions of execution, torture or
exile. The two dominant models in the United States were the
Auburn system, developed by New York State, and the
Pennsylvania system. 23 Both were designed, as David Rothman
states, "to separate the offender from all contact with corruption,
both within and without its walls."2 4 In the Pennsylvania system,
the prisoner was kept in solitary confinement, while in the Auburn
system he worked and ate with other prisoners, but was forbidden
to converse with them. Thus isolated from corrupting influences,
the prisoner was supposed to reflect on the evil of his ways, to read
the Bible, and to learn to avoid the sins of idleness by working.
As time went on, of course, ideas of rehabilitation changed.
The Auburn system proved impossible to maintain, while the
Pennsylvania system, when properly administered, had an
unfortunate tendency to drive the prisoners insane.25  As
industrialism spread and public education became the norm,
vocational and academic training came to replace remorse and
discipline as the principle instrument for rehabilitation.26 But the
basic concept of the penitentiary or prison has remained
unchanged since its conception. Convicted felons are separated
from their former life, confined in a secure facility, and subjected
22. See supra note 11.
23. See ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 11, at 79-108.
See generally W. DAVID LEWIS, FROM NEWGATE TO DANNEMORA: THE RISE OF THE
PENITENTIARY IN NEW YORK (1965); NEGLEY K. TEETERS, THE CRADLE OF THE
PENITENTIARY: THE WALNUT STREET JAIL AT PHILADELPHIA, 1773-1835 (1955);
NEGLEY K. TEETERS & JOHN D. SHEARER, THE PRISON AT PHILADELPHIA: CHERRY
HILL, THE SEPARATE SYSTEM OF PRISON DISCIPLINE: 1829-1913 (1957).
24. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 11, at 83. Rothman
quotes a New York prison warden as telling the prisoners, upon their arrival at the
institution, "You are to be literally buried from the world." Id. at 95.
25. See ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 11; Rothman,
Perfecting the Prison, supra note 11, at 124-26; CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN
NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 120 (Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc. 1961) (1842) ('The
system here is rigid, strict and hopeless solitary confinement. I believe it, in its
effects, to be cruel and wrong. In its intention, I am well convinced that it is kind,
humane and meant for reformation .... "). On the deleterious effects of isolation,
see MAX GRUNHUT, PENAL REFORM 60 (1948); IGNATIEFF, supra note 13, at 139-40;
LEWIS, supra note 23, at 67-70.
26. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 159-63; PAUL W. KEVE, PRISONS AND THE
AMERICAN CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF U.S. FEDERAL CORRECTIONS 51-73 (1991);
Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 11, at 169, 176-78.
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to some regimen that will change their attitudes and enable them
to be productive, law-abiding citizens once they are released.
It is important, in understanding the premise of
imprisonment in modern society, to distinguish between
punishment and the mode of punishment. Punishment is the
intentional infliction of an evil for violation of some legal rule. The
crucial consideration is to inflict some sort of unpleasantness, but
the particular type of unpleasantness is not determined by the
concept of punishment; any of the innumerable afflictions which
common experience can suggest, or human ingenuity devise, will
satisfy the basic purpose. Physical torture, exile, forced labor, or
non-working incarceration are all perfectly adequate. It is true
that the social consensus may regard some of these punishments
as harsher than others, but, as micro-economic analysis suggests,
they can be readily equalized by varying their amounts.2 7 Thus,
we might conclude that five years of forced labor equals ten years
of exile or twelve hours of being hung on a meathook.
The distinction between punishment and the mode of
punishment becomes clear when punishment is refracted into its
component parts. According to the standard account, the purposes
of punishment are special deterrence, general deterrence, just
deserts, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 28 Of these,
the first three will be equally satisfied by any mode of punishment,
that is, any infliction of pain on the offender as a result of his
27. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 125 (Avery R. Katz ed., 1998).
For a thoughtful discussion of this issue, see NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY,
BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL
SENTENCING SYSTEM 37-110 (1990). Although Morris and Tonry take account of a
number of deontological and cultural factors that Becker's utilitarian approach
ignores, they come to the same conclusion regarding interchangeability. See id. In
any event, the controversial aspect of this claim is the idea that a large enough fine
is equivalent to serious punishment of another sort. See id. Some people might
argue, on just deserts or retributive grounds, that no fine is severe enough for truly
serious offenses. But no one argues, on these grounds or others, that torture or
penal servitude cannot be made equivalent to incarceration; our objections to these
methods certainly do not arise from their lack of severity.
28. See GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 30-33 (1998);
Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1012-17
(1940) (discussing goals of punishment). These are conscious social policies. In
addition, punishment serves a variety of structural purposes, such as maintaining
social solidarity, controlling disadvantaged populations, and expressing prevailing
sensibilities. See generally DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A
STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY (1990). It is not inconceivable that some of these
purposes would be explicitly acknowledged by official sources, or that they would be
factored into public policy making. By and large, however, they remain
interpretations by observers, rather than declared objectives of political
participants. They thus cannot serve to justify prison or prison policies, and it is
these justifications that are the focus of this Essay.
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infraction. Any punishment will discourage the offender from
committing further crimes, the only variable being the amount of
punishment which, as stated, can be equalized among the different
modes. Similarly, any punishment will discourage others from
committing crimes; with the amounts equalized, the remaining
variable would appear to be the extent to which the punishment is
publicized. Finally, any punishment, that is, any infliction of pain,
should satisfy society's need for just deserts and retribution. 29
Apart from considerations of incapacitation and rehabilitation,
therefore, there appears to be no inherent basis for choosing
among different modes of punishment.30
Given the ability of any mode of punishment to satisfy these
basic purposes, the most natural choice would be the simplest, in
terms of both administrative capacity and resource expenditure.
Those criteria are best met by physical torture. Administratively,
it requires only some rudimentary restraints and a few unskilled
employees; as for physical resources, it demands little more than a
knife and a torch. As an incidental benefit, it appears to be the
mode of punishment that provides the greatest enjoyment for the
person inflicting the punishment. The pragmatic advantages of
torture, or corporal punishment, to use the more polite expression,
have led Graeme Newman to propose its reinstitution in
contemporary society.31 While this seems inconceivable, it must be
remembered that when penitentiaries were first developed,
corporal punishment was quite conceivable-indeed, it was still
widespread. The penitentiary was explicitly conceived as an
alternative to this venerable, widely-accepted mode of
punishment.
Justifications for the adoption of incarceration in general, or
the penitentiary in particular, are often phrased in terms of the
disadvantages of the alternatives. Capital punishment is regarded
as too severe for most offenses and torture too barbaric, 32 while
29. See GRAEME NEWMAN, JUST AND PAINFUL: A CASE FOR CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT OF CRIMINALS 37-39 (2d ed. 1995). "There is no expectation at all,
according to the retributive philosophy, that the offender should have learned not
to repeat his crime. What he has learned is that his crime has a reciprocal cost to
him in suffering." Id. at 180.
30. This Essay does not discuss the death penalty, since it has relatively little
to do with the design and operation of prisons. But see infra note 93 and
accompanying text (noting conditions on death row). Despite the current
enthusiasm for this device, it will only affect a minute fraction of those convicted of
a crime. In 1994, for example, some 2890 convicted persons were under sentence of
death, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 1994 (1996),
while more than one million were in prison or jail.
31. See NEWMAN, supra note 29.
32. The precise source of these attitudes is an interesting question. The most
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exile requires the use of someone else's territory as a dumping
ground for one's undesired citizens. These negative justifications
have a certain historical validity. As described above, capital
punishment, torture, and transportation had, for a variety of
reasons, all become impractical in late eighteenth century
England. Criminal justice officials were thus impelled by
necessity to develop new alternatives.
Negative justifications and pragmatic necessity, however,
may generate a search for alternatives, but they cannot by
themselves provide the basis for designing such alternatives. To
begin with, people have to conceive of the alternatives; once this
work has been done, and a few hundred years have passed, the
solution they devise may seem so obvious that it can be regarded
as a purely practical response to problems with the prevailing
approaches. At the time, however, the alternative was a new idea,
and could not have been developed without some sort of
affirmative rationale. Second, we should not be too quick to
ascribe past people's behavior to cynical pragmatism. It is difficult
to organize and institute a comprehensive change like the
development of penitentiaries unless that change promises
affirmative advantages, and unless it appeals to people's
aspirations as well as their needs. This is not to deny the
motivating force of practicality, or of self-interest. Rather, the
point is that at all times-in the past as much as in the present-
there is a close relationship among pragmatic, self-interested
alternatives, and the motivating force of ideas and ideals.
The concept of rehabilitation decisively determined Western
society's preference for incarceration as a mode of punishment.
Whatever the aversion to torture, and whatever the impracticality
of exile, it was the affirmative desire to reform the criminal that
provided the essential argument for developing this expensive,
administratively demanding means of punishment. To
punishment itself, it adds the desire that a criminal who has
completed the term of incarceration will go forth to lead a
productive, law-abiding life.33 Of the many conceptual bases for
this political and social choice, three are particularly notable. The
first is a concept of universal citizenship. The developing ideology
of the modern nation state, most dramatically reflected in the
convincing explanation is offered by GARLAND, supra note 27, at 213-47, based on
the analysis of modern sensibility that is developed in NORBERT ELIAS, THE
CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS (Edmund Jephcott trans., Urizen
Books 1978) (1939).
33. See supra note 11.
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works of Fichte and Hegel,34 led to the belief that every person was
a citizen, a member of the state, and needed to understand and
fulfill the responsibilities of that position. The criminal, of course,
had forfeited his citizenship in some sense, but once his
punishment is complete he will necessarily resume that role.
Rehabilitation is the attempt to equip him to do so, curing him of
the moral blindness that prevented him from perceiving his
membership in the secular collectivity of the state.
Second, and closely related, was the idea that every human
being has natural rights of a political nature. 35 The American Bill
of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man are
contemporaneous with the birth of the prison. This belief did not
yield the idea that the criminal has a right to be rehabilitated, but
it did produce the attitude that it was desirable to do so. Pre-
Enlightenment society was prepared to regard people as existing
for the benefit of others, and equally prepared to treat the criminal
as an outcast, as someone who can be exiled or ignored. Modern
society sees every person as a rights-bearer, as an equal member
of its society. Consequently, it will seek a mode of punishment
that will enable the wrongdoer to return to the community and
live a productive life.
Finally, the rehabilitative prison was motivated by a new
psychology, a belief in personality development as a secular
phenomenon. 36 Life was no longer viewed as a prelude to eternal
bliss or damnation, nor punishment as a means of obtaining a
confession that would save the wrong-doer's soul. Rather, life was
a self-contained set of experiences, with its own course of
development. Punishment came to be viewed as an event in that
development, an event that could alter its course and provide a
happier continuation. As John Bender has observed, the
contemporaneous development of the novel as the dominant form
of fiction was not adventitious. The prison sentence, like the
34. See J.G. FICHTE, FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL RIGHT (Frederick Neuhouser
ed., Michael Baur trans., 2000); G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 155-223
(T.M. Knox trans., 1952). On Hegel's theory of the state, see FREDERICK
NEUHOUSER, FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S SOCIAL THEORY: ACTUALIZING FREEDOM
(2000); CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 428-61 (1975).
35. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 175-98 (1967); DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS:
KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 45-79 (1987).
36. See 2 PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION: THE SCIENCE
OF FREEDOM 3-12, 511-16 (1977); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL
DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 1-50 (Frederick Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1987)
(1985).
Law and Inequality
novel, was conceived as a moral progress, a transformation of the
individual through a reflective consciousness.3 7
In short, the prison was the product of new attitudes that
clustered around the idea of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation was its
essential purpose, its goal, and the basis for its design. At present,
rehabilitation is so familiar that it appears inevitable, a fixture in
our institutional landscape. But it did not possess this character
when it was first devised; at that time, it was a real innovation
and an alternative to the familiar punishment of torture or
transportation. The reason it seemed like a superior alternative
was because it promised to rehabilitate the criminal as well as
punish him.
II. Rehabilitation Versus Servitude
Although rehabilitation is the historical premise of the
modern prison, one might argue that it need not be regarded as its
continuing objective. Other purposes for incarceration are
conceivable. Perhaps one of these has displaced rehabilitation,
and now serves as a substitute rationale that fully explains and
justifies the institution. Such a substitution process would not be
unprecedented; social institutions that began by serving one
purpose sometimes owe their continued existence to their ability to
serve another one, just as evolution adapts existing body parts to
varied functions. Many nations use the military forces that they
developed in eras of external threat as a means of education or a
source of civil engineering services once the threat abates. The
Salvation Army, the March of Dimes, the YMCA, and Harvard
University have all changed their original mission.3 8 The agency
that regulates our national banks is still called the Comptroller of
the Currency because its former function, now fully assumed by
the Federal Reserve Board, involved monetary control. 39 Perhaps
such a change has occurred in connection with prisons.
As stated at the outset, the two functions that prisons as a
particular form of punishment might conceivably fulfill, apart from
rehabilitation, are servitude and incapacitation. This assertion
37. See generally JOHN BENDER, IMAGINING THE PENITENTIARY: FICTION AND
THE ARCHITECTURE OF MIND IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1987).
38. See generally SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD,
1636-1936 (1936); HARRY EDWARD NEAL, THE HALLELUJAH ARMY (1961); NINA
SEAVEY ET AL., A PARALYZING FEAR: THE TRIUMPH OVER POLIO IN AMERICA (1998);
Mayer N. Zald & Patricia Denton, From Evangelism to General Services: The
Transformation of the YMCA, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL
SOCIETY 143 (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1987).
39. See 1 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS 28-40 (1988).
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can now be clarified in light of the discussion in the preceding
section. Prisons clearly serve the purposes of general deterrence,
special deterrence, just deserts and retribution, but any
punishment, any government infliction of pain for proscribed
behavior, must inevitably serve these purposes. Why should a
society replace an administratively simple and intuitively
appealing device like corporal punishment with something as
elaborate and expensive as the modern prison? Rehabilitation was
clearly such a justification when prisons were developed in the
Anglo-American world, but perhaps there is a substitute
justification that would work as well, or better, in the
contemporary era.
This section will discuss servitude, reserving the question of
incapacitation for the following section. The concept of servitude
is that convicted felons are compelled to provide society with
useful labor.40 For such labor to be punishment, it must be labor
that the convict is being compelled to perform against his will;
because he is performing it against his will, he must be
incarcerated in some fashion in order to compel him to perform it.
Involuntary servitude of this sort has two rationales. The
first, and more obvious one, is simply to get something useful out
of punishment. If society cuts off burglars' hands, it has gained
nothing, apart from the functions of punishment itself, but a pile
of severed hands. But if it compels the burglar to work as its mode
of punishment, it then obtains the benefit of whatever labor he is
required to perform. The second rationale is that the felon has a
moral debt to society, and that compulsory labor is a means of
repaying that debt.41 Punishment itself may constitute his just
deserts or deter others from following in his evil footsteps, but
punishment through useful labor enables the felon to provide a
positive benefit for society in compensation for the harm caused by
his crime.
One rationale that does not apply to servitude is that it
enables the felon to learn a skill or develop orderly work habits.
40. See ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORTH OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH 1-36, 186-95 (1996); CHARLES
ORR, STALIN'S SLAVE CAMPS: AN INDICTMENT OF MODERN SLAVERY (1951); RUTH
PIKE, PENAL SERVITUDE IN EARLY MODERN SPAIN (1983); J. THORSTEN SELLIN,
SLAVERY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM (1976).
41. See SELLIN, supra note 40. For a general theory of punishment that adopts
this rationale, see HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 31-36 (1976). Cf. SUSAN KISS SARNOFF,
PAYING FOR CRIME: THE POLICIES AND POSSIBILITIES OF CRIME VICTIM
REIMBURSEMENT (1996) (proposing punishments that lead to reimbursement of
victims).
Law and Inequality
That is rehabilitation, probably the dominant mode of
rehabilitation in American prisons at the present time. Of course,
there is no reason why the same mode of punishment cannot serve
two different functions, and in fact, all do so. 42 But the purpose of
this discussion is to sort out justifications, to see if there is any
conceivable basis for abandoning the concept of rehabilitation and
grounding incarceration on some other rationale. Consequently, if
one wants to argue that convict labor provides an alternative
rationale to rehabilitation as the basis of the modern prison, that
labor must be used for some purpose other than vocational
training. Forcing prisoners to work in order to provide them with
work habits or vocational skills cannot be regarded as an
alternative to rehabilitation-it is rehabilitation.
There is certainly a historical basis for justifying
imprisonment on grounds of servitude. While incarceration was
not used to any significant extent as a mode of punishment in the
pre-modern Anglo-American world, it was common on the
European continent. Foucault asserts that prisons did not exist in
Europe prior to the nineteenth century, 43  but as Pieter
Spierenberg notes, he is wrong. The Dutch developed large penal
institutes in the seventeenth century, using the prisoners to
manufacture textiles. 44 In Foucault's own country, convicts were
used extensively as galley slaves and kept in prison when they
were not needed on the ships. 45 Thus, the work required in the
pre-modern prisons was not conceived as educational, but as a way
of obtaining inexpensive labor for undesirable but necessary tasks.
42. See MOORE, supra note 5, at 92-94.
43. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 120-31 (Alan Sheridan
trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1978). Foucault argues that the transition from
corporal punishment to prison represented an effort by the modern state to assert
direct, or disciplinary, control over people's bodies through the modality of
regimented institutions. He thus argues that the rehabilitative goals of prisons
were a sham, a fagade intended to conceal the true, disciplinary nature of the
institutions. This is really not very different from the Marxist claim that prisons
are designed to suppress the lower classes. See GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO
KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1968). Such claims can be
explanatory, but they cannot be justificatory. Consequently, they do not address
the issue addressed in this Essay, which involves the social and political
justifications for prison and prison practices. See supra note 27. Moreover,
Foucault's assertion that rehabilitation was a sham is unconvincing, as it relies on
a conspiracy theory of history that gives entirely too much weight to concepts. See
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 290-96 (1998);
GARLAND, supro note 27, at 162-75.
44. See Spierenburg, supra note 12, at 68-72; SPIERENBURG, supra note 17.
45. See MICHEL BOURDET-PLtVILLE, JUSTICE IN CHAINS: FROM THE GALLEYS TO
DEVIL'S ISLAND (Anthony Rippon trans., 1960); SELLIN, supra note 39, at 43-55;
Spierenburg, supra note 12, at 66-67.
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What was new in the nineteenth century was the concept of
prison, and prison work, as a means of rehabilitation.
The line between servitude and rehabilitative work, however,
would appear to be a rather fine one. After all, many American
prison systems require all their able-bodied inmates to work; there
is little evidence that such work is truly rehabilitative, and less
still that corrections officials make any effort to determine
whether this is the case. In fact, however, the distinction between
these two approaches to work in prison is a dramatic one, and
there is dramatic evidence that using prison work as a form of
servitude, rather than as a mode of rehabilitation, is morally
unacceptable in our society.
For about a century, one section of our country, namely the
South, treated prison as a form of servitude rather than as a form
of rehabilitation. 46 National authorities desisted from intervening
on behalf of prisoners,47 just as they desisted from taking action
against Southern governments on behalf of African Americans. At
about the same time that the policy toward African Americans
changed, the policy toward prisoners changed as well. In a series
of rulings that represent the high water mark of judicial
intervention in public institutions, the federal courts declared, in
effect, that prisons based on the principle of servitude violate the
Constitution.48 Although subsequent judicial doctrines regarding
prison conditions have been somewhat modified, this basic
conclusion has remained unchallenged, and now represents a clear
moral consensus in our nation.
Malcolm Feeley and I have explored the extent to which the
prison reform decisions represent a rejection of the South's
distinctive, servitude-based approach to imprisonment in our book
Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State.49 During the ante-
bellum period, many Southern states created penitentiaries on the
46. See MARK T. CARLETON, POLITICS AND PUNISHMENT: THE HISTORY OF THE
LOUISIANA STATE PENAL SYSTEM 8-11 (1971); BRADLEY STEWART CHILTON, PRISONS
UNDER THE GAVEL: THE FEDERAL COURT TAKEOVER OF GEORGIA PRISONS 15-19
(1991); BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LITIGATED
REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS 21-24, 69-74 (1989); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN
SLAVERY": PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 135-55 (1996)
(Mississippi); LARRY W. YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM 9-10 (1989).
47. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 964 (1957); United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio
Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953); Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A
Critique of the Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J.
506 (1963).
48. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 43, at 150-71.
49. See generally FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 42.
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same rehabilitative model as New York and Pennsylvania. 50 The
reason for this similarly progressive behavior was that the South's
fatal distinction from the remainder of the nation did not affect its
correctional policies. African Americans in the South were almost
all enslaved, and slaves were generally not imprisoned. Instead,
they were punished by their master as a private matter, usually
by whipping, or, if convicted by a court, by precisely the same form
of corporal punishment.51 As a result, most of the prisoners in the
South's ante-bellum penitentiaries were White.
Following the Civil War, the situation changed dramatically.
The freed slaves were now citizens, and their punishment for
crimes became a public matter. Many of the penitentiaries,
together with other parts of the South's infrastructure, had been
destroyed during the War. The South's economy had been
destroyed as well, and state governments had few resources to
devote to any purpose, least of all to criminal offenders. In
response, many Southern states turned to convict leasing as their
predominant means of punishment. The leasing system was a
contractual arrangement in which a private entrepreneur was
given charge of the state's convicts in exchange for a fee. The
entrepreneur then tried to earn back the amount of the fee, and
produce a profit for himself, by making the convicts work on his
own projects or by lending them to others.5 2
The almost unimaginable cruelties that resulted can be at
least partially explained by a lessee's motivations. Having paid
his fee, his primary incentives were to get as much work out of the
convicts as possible, and to spend as little as he possibly could on
their food, clothing, and shelter. These were, of course, the same
incentives that motivated the ante-bellum slave owners. The
50. See CARLETON, supra note 46, at 8-11; JAMES FERGUSON, A HISTORY OF THE
ARKANSAS PENITENTIARY 9 (1965); SELLIN, supra note 39, at 138-41; WILLIAM
BANKS TAYLOR, BROKERED JUSTICE: RACE, POLITICS, AND MISSISSIPPI PRISONS,
1798-1992, at 12-30 (1993).
51. See CARLETON, supra note 46, at 13; SELLIN, supra note 40, at 134-38;
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM
SOUTH 209-10, 224-27 (1956).
52. See EDWARD L. AYRES, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER
RECONSTRUCTION 154-55 (1992); EDWARD L. AYRES, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 34-72 (1984)
[hereinafter VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE]; CARLETON, supra note 46; MILFRED C.
FIERCE, SLAVERY REVISITED: BLACKS AND THE SOUTHERN CONVICT LEASE SYSTEM,
1865-1933 (1994); PAUL W. KEVE, THE HISTORY OF CORRECTIONS IN VIRGINIA 72-87
(1986); LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 40; MATTHEW I. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET
ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1866-1928 (1996);
MCKELVEY, supra note 11, at 197-216; SELLIN, supra note 40, at 145-62; TAYLOR,
supra note 50, at 31-54; YACKLE, supra note 46, at 9-10.
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attitudes of the slave owners, however, were tempered by their
desire to keep their slaves alive, since they had either paid
significant amounts to purchase the slave or to cover the expenses
of their childhood upbringing. This consideration was absent in
the case of convict leasing, however, since the lessee paid one sum
for the entire lease. As one Southerner explained: "Before the war
we owned the negroes. If a man had a good negro, he could afford
to take care of him: if he was sick, get a doctor .... But these
convicts: we don't own 'em. One dies, get another." 53
Ultimately, the cruelties of the convict leasing system became
so extreme that it had to be abandoned. It was replaced by
prisons, that is, relatively large, state-run institutions that kept
the convict incarcerated for the length of his sentence. These
institutions bore a certain resemblance to the continuously-
operated prisons of Northern states, but there was a crucial
difference. Prisons in other parts of the country continued to use
rehabilitation as an organizing principle, however poorly they
might have achieved it. The Southern prisons ignored this
principle, and were modeled instead on the culturally familiar
pattern of the slave plantation. 54 Many Southern prisons actually
consisted of former slave plantations that had been purchased by
the state. They housed the prisoners in barracks reminiscent of
the slave barracks on the old plantation, rather than in the closed
cells characteristic of non-Southern prisons. The warden often
lived in a large home on the prison property, and used tractable
prisoners as household servants, just as the plantation owner lived
on the plantation and staffed his home with tractable slaves.
Prisoners were disciplined by means of corporal punishment,
primarily the lash, just as the slaves had been. When prisoners
escaped, they were pursued by dogs that were undoubtedly the
canine descendants of those that had been used on the plantations
to recapture runaway slaves.55
Beyond these external features lay a more important and far-
reaching difference. Southern prisons, like slave plantations, were
designed to produce a profit for the state, or at least to run at
cost.56 They were not structured, and not intended, to rehabilitate
53. CARLETON, supra note 46, at 45. Part of this quote was used as the title of
Matthew 1. Mancini's study, see supra note 52.
54. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 43, at 151-52.
55. For descriptions of Southern prisons, see CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note
46, at 15-16; FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 43, at 152-56; STEVE J. MARTIN &
SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, TEXAS PRISONS: THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DowN 5
(1987); OSHINSKY, supra note 46; TAYLOR, supra note 50, at xii, 77.
56. See CHILTON, supra note 46, at 17-19; CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 46,
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the prisoners at all. For Southern wardens, as for wardens in
other parts of the nation, the most important goal was to prevent
any of the prisoners from escaping-that is a basic premise of any
mode of incarceration. Beyond this, however, their success was
not measured by the order they kept, or the programs they
provided, but by their ability to manage without receiving any
monetary appropriation from the state.5 7 This distinctive goal
produced incentives similar to those of the contract lessees or the
plantation owners. Food, clothing, and shelter were provided only
in the amounts necessary for bare subsistence; medical care was
often not provided at all. The prisoners were forced to work,
generally as unskilled agricultural laborers, from sunup to
sundown, and were beaten if they failed to perform. They worked
in "long lines" as the slaves had, under the supervision of an
unpaid fellow convict who had been designated a trustee, as the
slaves had generally worked under the supervision of slave
overseers. All of these barbarities were designed to produce cash
crops, while minimizing monetary expenditures on maintenance of
the prisoners. 58 Thus, the Southern prison was different in its
basic conception from prisons in the remainder of the nation; it
was conceived as a form of servitude, not as a means of
rehabilitation.
The survival of this model for about a century may be
attributed to the South's divergent culture,59 and to the reluctance
of the national government to intervene in matters that were
regarded as the proper subjects of state control. 60  It almost
certainly did not reflect any general approbation, or even tolerance
of the plantation model. Although the United States produced a
massive scholarly literature addressed to punishment and prisons,
none of it purported to justify the plantation model. The American
Prison Association, one of the many Progressive-era organizations
that promulgated standards of good practice in its field,
articulated principles that were the antithesis of the plantation
model, and embodied the rehabilitative approach. 61 No Northern
at 137; MARTIN & EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 55, at 5-23; YACKLE, supra note 46,
at 9-10.
57. This could be partially explained by the South's economic prostration
following the Civil War, see OSHINSKY, supra note 46, at 11-13, and the South's
continued poverty relative to the rest of the nation may have provided a continuing
incentive. Nonetheless, the particular way in which Southern states chose to save
money reflected a distinctive mentality.
58. See supra note 45.
59. See AYRES, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE, supra note 52.
60. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 42, at 30-34.
61. See generally AM. PRISON ASS'N, A MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS
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states adopted this model; while they were as anxious as their
Southern counterparts to minimize the amount of taxpayer dollars
spent on prisoners, the idea of creating servitude-based
institutions that would run at no cost, or produce a profit, did not
spread beyond the South.
This general rejection of the plantation model became
dramatically apparent once changes in judicial attitudes and
doctrine had eliminated the barriers to federal court review of
state prison conditions. In the course of a single decade, from 1965
to 1975, the courts declared that virtually every aspect of the
plantation model violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment.62 It was unconstitutional to house
prisoners, at least dangerous ones, in open barracks, to discipline
them with the lash, to deny them adequate food, clothing and
medical services, to use convicts as guards, and to subject them to
grueling, repetitive labor. 63  Taken together, these decisions
effectively declared that servitude was an unconstitutional
purpose of incarceration. Southern states could no longer run
their prisons on the model of a slave plantation; they would be
required to treat them as a funded government program. The idea
of a prison based on servitude, long-rejected by the majority of
people in this country, was extirpated from the one place where it
had been deemed acceptable.
These rulings did not forbid prisons from encouraging, or
even requiring, prisoners to work. Work in prisons serves a
variety of functions that are quite distinct from servitude. 64 To
begin with, many prisoners work voluntarily, for wages.65 While
the work provided is often repetitive, and the wages are low,
prisoners often regard it as better than doing nothing and getting
nothing. Second, prisons may require work to maintain the
(1954); MCKELVEY, supra note 11, at 172-89; Dale K. Sechrest & Ernest G. Reimer,
Adopting National Standards for Correctional Reform, 46 FED. PROBATION 18
(1982).
62. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 42, at 34-46, 162-7 1.
63. Id. at 30-50.
64. See Timothy J. Flanagan, Prison Labor and Industry, in THE AMERICAN
PRISON, supra note 1, at 135. See generally Randall Guynes & Robert Greiser,
Contemporary Prison Industry Goals, in A STUDY OF PRISON INDUSTRY: HISTORY,
COMPONENTS, GOALS (Am. Corr. Ass'n ed., 1986).
65. This is generally described as prison industry. See JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., No
ESCAPE: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 116-18 (1991). See generally
GAIL S. FUNKE ET AL., ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES
(1982); Gordon Hawkins, Prison Labor and Prison Industries, in 5 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 85 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris
eds., 1983) [hereinafter CRIME AND JUSTICE]; Richard Seiter, Federal Prison
Industries, 1 FED. PRISONS J. 11 (1990).
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institution-to prepare food, clean the facilities, and make
repairs. 66 The amount of such work is inherently limited, and the
general view is that it is reasonable to require a group of able-
bodied people to maintain their own institution. Finally, and most
important for present purposes, prisoners can be offered work, or
even required to work, in order to learn a trade or skill.67 This of
course is not servitude, but rehabilitation; together with academic
education, it is the most common form of rehabilitation offered in
American prisons. The line between maintenance work, or even
rehabilitative work, and servitude may seem a subtle one in the
abstract, but it is relatively clear in practice. It is, in fact, clear
enough to be articulated and enforced by the judiciary as a legal
standard. Voluntary work, maintenance work, and rehabilitative
work are all acceptable. Designing a prison around the principle
of servitude violates the Constitution.
III. Rehabilitation Versus Incapacitation
While servitude has been definitively rejected as a mode of
punishment, incapacitation is very much in vogue. In fact, it has
been declared, in many state penal laws and by many academic
commentators, to be the dominant purpose of imprisonment.68 It
is regarded as the successor to rehabilitation, the cold but just and
necessary truth to which our society has awakened after its
deluded dream that it could turn bad people good.
Despite its popularity, incapacitation suffers from a fatal
defect as a theory of imprisonment, a defect that is analogous to
the defect of regarding deterrence as a theory of imprisonment. As
discussed above, prison cannot be justified on deterrence grounds
alone because any punishment, any infliction of pain on the
offender, will, at least in theory, provide both general and special
deterrence. Incapacitation, to be sure, is a policy goal that clearly
distinguishes prison from other modes of non-capital punishment.
Corporal punishment, for example, does not incapacitate at all
unless the offender is seriously maimed. Imprisonment, however,
completely incapacitates the offender for the length of his
sentence, except in the rare case when he escapes. 69 Thus, an
66. See Flanagan, supra note 63, at 146-47.
67. See ANN CHIH LIN, REFORM IN THE MAKING: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN PRISON 39-41, 103-08 (2000); STAN STOJKOVIC & RICK LOVELL,
CORRECTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 215-17 (2d ed. 1997).
68. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 1, 10-12 (1995).
69. Of course, prisoners can commit crimes of various kinds in prison. These
are often handled administratively, but it is certainly not unheard of for an inmate
[Vol. 19:343
2001] THE INEVITABILITY OF REHABILITATION 361
incapacitation rationale appears to justify prison as a particular
mode of punishment.
The defect in this account, however, is that prison necessarily
incapacitates, no matter what regime prevails inside the prison
walls. Just as a deterrence rationale fails to tell us anything about
the mode of punishment, incapacitation, while it does identify
prison as the preferred mode of punishment, is equally
uninformative about the mode of imprisonment. Prison
incapacitates by definition; therefore, to declare that the purpose
of imprisonment is incapacitation is like saying that the purpose of
a book is having people read it. The statement conveys no useful
information. To put the matter in practical terms, consider the
position of a prison warden who is charged with developing a
strategy to deal with the prisoner who comes into his institution.
The law tells him that the purpose of imprisonment is
incapacitation. To this end, it tells him how long he is to keep the
prisoner, as imprisonment statutes generally do, and it tells him
not to allow the prisoner to escape, as such statutes inevitably do.
Beyond that, it tells him nothing. It provides no guidance
whatsoever about the way the prisoner should be treated in the
institution.
As Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins observe, the
scholarly and practical literature regarding incapacitation is
impoverished, despite the supposed popularity of the idea. 70
Perhaps one reason for this situation is that there is nothing much
to say about incapacitation as a practice, apart from a discussion
of prison security that, like all aspects of incapacitation, would be
equally relevant to any use of an incarcerative policy. For
example, William Spelman's Criminal Incapacitation is a
thoughtful analysis, using economic theory, of incapacitative policy
and sentencing practices, 7 1 and even includes a discussion of
intermediate sanctions. 72 But Spelman has nothing to say about
to be tried and convicted of a crime he has committed behind bars. See, e.g., United
States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Silverstein, 732
F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1984). These crimes are not generally viewed as counting
against the principle of incapacitation, since the purpose of that principle is to
protect members of civil society from the offender. The protection of prisoners from
other prisoners is a problem of prison administration. Thus, an incarcerated
prisoner poses no threat to civil society unless he escapes (or, even more rarely,
takes a visitor hostage).
70. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 67, at 12-14.
71. See WILLIAM SPELMAN, CRIMINAL INCAPACITATION 312 (1994) (concluding
that "incapacitation cannot, by itself, solve the crime problem. Under the most
favorable conditions ... no more than 22 percent of potential crimes can be
prevented through incapacitation.").
72. See id. at 304- 10.
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the way prisons should be run, or the way prisoners should be
treated when they are confined; such considerations are invisible
from the perspective of a purely incapacitative policy.
It is sometimes said that the incapacitative prison functions
as a warehouse for the prisoner. 73 This may seem to reflect
commendable sincerity, but it does very little else. To describe a
prison as a warehouse is nothing more than a metaphor, and it is
not an apt one. The purpose of a warehouse is to store goods of
some sort-automotive parts or library books, for example, so that
they do not encumber high-use settings such as repair shops or
open stacks, but are available when someone needs them.
Prisoners are indeed being kept away from the high-use areas of
general society, but they are not being held so that they are
available when needed. The facilities that held unused galley
slaves in Renaissance France may have fit this description, but at
present, an army barracks is more aptly described as a human
warehouse than is a prison. Moreover, a warehouse is supposed to
receive items that are in good condition and to hold those items
unchanged. The automotive parts and library books are supposed
to come out of the warehouse looking just the way they looked
when they went in; the warehouse's job is to avoid deterioration of
useful parts or books. An army barracks is designed to satisfy this
function; it receives trained soldiers-otherwise it would be
described as a training facility-and it is supposed to hold these
soldiers, without significant further training, until they are
needed. A good barracks will simply provide the soldiers with
sufficient physical and mental activity so that their skills do not
deteriorate. It is difficult to imagine that this is truly what we
envision for a prison. Prisons do not receive good items, but bad
ones. If these people do come out the way they went in, even
assuming no further deterioration occurs,7 4 they will presumably
be going back to prison again at some point in the future, which is
not what anyone wants. The warehouse image does not even
capture the special deterrent effect which everyone hopes prison
will provide, quite apart from any possibility of rehabilitation.
Putting the warehouse idea aside, there are three
interpretations of incapacitation, as an imprisonment strategy,
that might confer some content on it. First, it might be seen as
encouraging wardens to maintain an orderly prison; second, it
73. MICHAEL WELCH, PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 51 (1999); Halleck & Witte,
supra note 7, at 379.
74. Prisons often make the prisoner a good deal worse, although generally not
by design. See generally LEE BOWKER, PRISON VICTIMIZATION (1980).
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might be seen as discouraging them from providing rehabilitative
programs; third, it might be seen as a directive to minimize costs.
The idea of order is closely associated with the work of John
DiIulio. 75 Malcolm Feeley and I have previously characterized
Dilulio's emphasis on this issue as fetishistic, 76 and the present
issue indicates the reason. What exactly is the purpose of
maintaining an orderly prison? Order is generally regarded as an
instrumentality, a means to an end, not an end in itself. One
could argue that it helps prevent escapes or decreases violence in
the prison. These are certainly commendable goals, but these are
results every prison tries to achieve, and thus provides no
particular content to the idea of incapacitation.77 To champion
order as a deontological value, without treating it as an
instrumentality for achieving some other purpose, one must derive
pleasure from the image of prisoners with clean uniforms,
marching in lockstep through neatly maintained hallways. But
this is something only a few people with unusual sensibilities
would enjoy. In the final analysis, this vision cannot truly be
derived from the idea of incapacitation' It is a separate goal as
well as being an idiosyncratic one.
A second way to confer content on the idea of incapacitation
is to treat it as opposing or discouraging rehabilitative efforts.
This may satisfy the more savage sensibilities of certain crime
victims and politicians, but it hardly solves the warden's problem.
Telling him not to rehabilitate the prisoners fails to tell him what
he should do with them. They can be woken in the morning, not
rehabilitated until lunchtime, given lunch, not rehabilitated until
dinner, not rehabilitated in the evening, and sent to bed. Of
course, it is not difficult to envision what the prisoners might be
doing when they are not being rehabilitated. They are watching
television, exercising, pumping iron, socializing (or anti-
socializing), and wandering aimlessly around. They might also be
engaged in the acceptable types of servitude, that is, earning
money by doing repetitive tasks or maintaining the prison itself.
But these activities cannot be derived from the idea of
75. See, e.g., John J. DIIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT (1987); DIIULIO, supra note 64, at 11-59.
76. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward Rubin, Prison Litigation and
Bureaucratic Development, 17 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 125, 137-43 (1992).
77. See generally MOORE, supra note 5. A more common argument is that order
contributes to the goal of rehabilitation, either because it is intrinsically
rehabilitative, as the Auburn and Pennsylvania plans asserted, or because it allows
more specific rehabilitative efforts, such as education and vocational training, to
proceed without disruption. But this assumes that the prison has a rehabilitative
goal, of course, and not a purely incapacitative one.
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incapacitation, or even from the idea of avoiding rehabilitation.
They have their own low-grade rationales, such as amusing the
prisoners, avoiding boredom because it is regarded as
unnecessarily cruel, or minimizing costs and providing service
within acceptable limits.
Finally, it might be argued that incapacitation is justified by
its ability to minimize incarceration costs. The difficulty with this
argument is that cost is a constraint on governmental programs,
but not an independent source of justification for those programs.
One can speak of achieving the program's goals at a lower cost,
and thus with a greater degree of efficiency, but those goals must
be independently determined. The purpose of building a cannon,
for example, is to defend a country by defeating its enemies. One
could reasonably argue that making a cannon with cheaper metal
would reduce costs, and thereby provide a preferable alternative to
the original design. But one could not argue that making a cannon
that does not fire a shell would be a preferable alternative, even
though it would reduce costs to an even greater extent. Similarly,
one cannot argue that incapacitation is justified because it is
cheaper than rehabilitation, unless one can also argue that those
cost savings are achieved without eliminating the basic purpose of
prison. This is not the case.
The basic purpose of prison, as indicated in Part I, is
rehabilitation; elimination of rehabilitative efforts would certainly
save money, but it would negate the prison's purpose. To be sure,
a purely incapacitative prison could still achieve the goals of
general deterrence, special deterrence, and retribution, as well as
incapacitation, but so would corporal punishment, which is clearly
less expensive than even the most parsimonious human
warehouse. Once one has saved money by building a cannon that
does not shoot, there is no reason why one should not save all the
money by building no cannon at all. In other words, the principle
of cost minimization has no stopping point unless one recognizes
the countervailing purpose for the item whose cost is being
minimized. In the prison context, that countervailing purpose is to
return the criminal to society in a condition that enables him to
function within that society in an acceptable manner. The
underlying incoherence of a purely incapacitative rationale for
prisons, presumably justified by cost minimization, is revealed by
the fact that, once again, it would not tell the warden what to do
with the prisoners. It would only lead him to test the limits of
constitutional acceptability by cutting every aspect of the prison's
budget.
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A related argument regarding costs has been advanced by
Michael Moore. According to Moore, rehabilitation "allocates
scarce societal resources away from other, more deserving groups
that want them (such as retarded and autistic children or the
poor) to a group that hardly can be said to deserve such favoured
status."7 8  One problem with this argument is that it applies
equally to prisons in general, and thereby leads us back to corporal
punishment again. A second problem is that it is artificial to
argue against rehabilitation by trying to establish a direct
opposition between prisoners and disabled children, just as it
would be artificial to argue in favor of rehabilitation by asserting
that it is a better use of funds than inefficient agricultural
subsidies. Government authorities must allocate available funds
among a wide range of programs. Once they have decided on a
particular program for substantive reasons, the level of funding
they provide for it is a pragmatic matter of distributing resources
across the total range. The third argument against Moore's point
is that the aspiration of rehabilitation is not merely to provide
benefits for the prisoner, but to provide benefits for society in
general by transforming criminals, most of whom will return to
that society, into acceptable citizens.
The problem with declaring incapacitation as the goal of
prison, therefore, is that the term has no content in this context.
It simply restates the choice of prison as our socially accepted
means of punishment. Unlike deterrence, it explains why we have
chosen prison over rival approaches such as corporal punishment
or shaming. But like deterrence, its force is exhausted once the
basic choice that it implies is made. Deterrence tells us to inflict
some pain on the offender during the long years of his
imprisonment, but does not indicate what sort of pain.
Incapacitation tells us that the pain is to be imprisonment, but
does not answer the question about the content or character of
such imprisonment. The idea of servitude in fact answers this
question, but as a general strategy, we have concluded that it is as
unacceptably barbaric as corporal punishment. That brings us
back to rehabilitation.
78. Id. at 86. Moore identifies two forms of rehabilitation, one where the
criminal is given such awful treatment that he decides never to commit another
crime, and a second that tries to benefit the prisoner in some way, which Moore
calls paternalistic. The first variant is a bit difficult to distinguish from special
deterrence. In any event, this Essay discusses Moore's second form of




IV. The Modern Concept of Rehabilitation
To summarize thus far, American prisons were conceived and
created on the basis of a rehabilitative model. None of the
alternative rationales for punishment can replace it. Servitude
and incapacitation are the only rationales, aside from
rehabilitation, that have anything to do with prisons as a mode of
punishment. But servitude leads to a way of treating prisoners
that is morally unacceptable, while incapacitation provides no
guidance at all. It would appear that the only acceptable way to
operate a prison in modern society is along rehabilitative lines.
Despite the condemnations of theorists, and the declarations
of state legislatures, American prison officials have never wavered
in their support of rehabilitation. Virtually all large prisons offer
vocational and academic training of some sort.79 Innovations such
as day treatment programs, work release, halfway houses, and
boot camps are only comprehensible as part of a rehabilitative
model; they clearly offer no advantage from the perspective of
incapacitation. 80 Studies of prison programs demonstrate this
point and independently illustrate the continuing commitment to
rehabilitation. To quote Zimring and Hawkins again, "patterns of
academic attention to issues in criminology [show] both the
unchallenged salience of rehabilitation as the principal topic over
time and the relative paucity of academic publications relating to
incapacitation." 81 Examining the titles of articles and books listed
in the Social Scisearch system during the 1980s, they found that
4199 referred to rehabilitation and recidivism, while only forty-five
referred to incapacitation. 82
Why then has rehabilitation been so roundly condemned, and
why have those condemnations seemed so persuasive? One reason
is that genuine abuses were committed by sincere believers in
rehabilitation, while other abuses were committed by those who
79. See LIN, supra note 67, at 6, 18-19. See generally Michael Welch,
Rehabilitation: Holding Its Ground in Corrections, 59 FED. PROBATION 3 (1995).
80. See generally RICHARD A. BALL ET AL., HOUSE ARREST AND CORRECTIONAL
POLICY (1988); CRIME & JUSTICE, supra note 64; SMART SENTENCING: THE
EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS (James M. Byrne et al. eds., 1992);
DIIULIO, supra note 64, at 60-102; BELINDA RODGERS MCCARTHY & BERNARD J.
MCCARTHY, JR., COMMUNITY-BASED CORRECTIONS (3d ed. 1997); Joan Petersilia,
Alternative Sanctions: Diverting Nonviolent Prisoners to Intermediate Sanctions:
The Impact of Prison Admissions and Corrections Costs, in MINIMIZING HARM 115
(Edward L. Rubin ed., 1999); SPELMAN, supra note 70, at 304-11; STOJKOVIC &
LOVELL, supra note 66, at 481-511; Doris Layton MacKenzie et al., Boot Camp
Prisons and Recidivism in Eight States, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 327 (1995).
81. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 67, at 12.
82. See id. at 12-13.
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used rehabilitation as a fagade to hide their depredations. 83 But
the most important reason is that the critics misunderstood the
basic character of the rehabilitative model. Their enthusiasm for
the attack on rehabilitation led them to be almost purposely
obtuse about its real character. An analysis of the arguments that
these critics advanced can thus be used to illuminate the character
of the rehabilitative model.
Three principal arguments have been voiced against the
validity of the rehabilitative idea. The first is the social science
finding that "nothing works," that rehabilitative programs have
had no success in achieving their intended goal.8 4 Second, it is
argued that rehabilitation authorizes an assault on the prisoner's
personality. This criticism points to the use of intrusive methods
such as brainwashing, behavior modification programs, drug
therapy, and shock treatment. 85 In addition, it argues that the
rehabilitative model implies that prisoners should be kept in
prison until the authorities consider them cured, even if this
greatly exceeds the punishment they merit on grounds of just
deserts. Finally, critics argue that the entire concept of
rehabilitation is inconsistent with the premises of our political
system.86 These arguments can be considered in turn.
The conclusion that rehabilitation is a failure is empirically
false. Once the impact of the initial findings had abated, social
scientists began to devote more detailed attention to rehabilitative
programs and produced more refined, modulated results.
Martinson himself withdrew his 1974 declaration that "nothing
works" as early as 1979.87 Meta-analyses and individual program
evaluations in the 1980s and 1990s advanced the unsurprising,
but previously unrecognized, idea that the effectiveness of
rehabilitation programs varies depending on the nature of the
intervention and the cooperation of the target group. 88 A recent
83. See generally STEPHEN SANSWEET, THE PUNISHMENT CURE (1975).
84. See Halleck & Witte, supra note 7; Martinson, supra note 6; NATL AcAD. OF
SCIS., supra note 8; Robinson & Smith, supra note 7.
85. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
86. See ALLEN, supra note 1, at 33-34.
87. Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding
Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 250 (1979).
88. See EFFECTIVE CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (Robert Ross & Paul Gendreau
eds., 1980); Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Rehabilitation: Reconsidering the 'Nothing Works' Debate, in THE AMERICAN
PRISON, supra note 1, at 23. See generally Paul Gendreau, The Principles of
Effective Intervention with Offenders, in CHOOSING CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS THAT
WORK (Alan Harland ed., 1996); Ted Palmer, Progranimic and Nonprogrammic
Aspects of Successful Intervention, in CHOOSING CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS THAT
WORK, supra; D.A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically
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study by Ann Chih Lin observes that the mode of implementation
is a crucial factor: when the rehabilitation program meets the need
and obtains the loyalty of the corrections staff, it will be
implemented well, and promises to be effective. When it does not,
the program will be implemented poorly, and will inevitably fail.8 9
Even without these empirical results, however, the
declaration that rehabilitation fails to achieve its declared
objective is highly suspect. Such a conclusion necessarily depends
upon a theory for evaluating social programs, but relatively little
thought has been devoted to this topic. Studies of the success or
failure of rehabilitation generally focus on the recidivism rate, that
is, the extent to which the offender reduces, maintains, or
increases his level of criminal activity upon his return to society.9 0
The obvious difficulty with this criterion is that it fails to specify a
standard for measuring success. If the standard is that any
criminal activity constitutes a failure-the way any loss of
telephone service to subscribers' homes constitutes a failure of the
telephone system-then rehabilitation will inevitably be judged a
failure. Moreover, by this standard, incapacitation will be judged
a success. Prisoners rarely escape from prison and even more
rarely commit crimes before they are recaptured. It does happen,
but it is a relatively uncommon event, perhaps as uncommon as
failures of telephone service. Surely, however, the level of
favorable results that constitutes success or failure needs to be
adjusted in accordance with the complexity of the task.
When we speak of rehabilitation, we are referring to an effort
to remedy a vast array of personal and social problems
experienced by some of society's most disadvantaged members.
This is not to excuse the criminal-many people experience similar
disadvantages and become productive citizens-but to recognize
the magnitude of the task. Many prisoners are functionally
illiterate or lack a high school degree, many lack training in any
legal trade, many are addicted to drugs or alcohol, and many
suffer severe psychological and social problems. Each of these
problems is difficult to resolve, and all are important to resolve if
the criminal is to be rehabilitated. An ex-convict who re-enters
society without at least a high school degree, without any
vocational skills, still suffering from addiction to illegal drugs or
Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1990);
Paul Gendreau & Robert R. Ross, Revivification of Rehabilitation: Evidence front
the 1980's, 4 JUST. Q. 349 (1987); Ted Palmer, The Effectiveness of Intervention:
Recent Trends and Current Issues, 37 CRIME & DELINQ. 330 (1991).
89. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 88.
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even alcohol, and without some resolution to his psychological or
social problems-in short, with any one of the many deficits that he
may have had when he was imprisoned-has a poor prognosis.
Prison rehabilitation programs attempt to address all these
problems, and others. Lin's study of programs in five federal
prisons revealed efforts to achieve sixth-grade literacy levels, to
provide high school diplomas, community college degrees, and
BA's. There were also efforts to teach a wide range of vocational
skills that include restaurant management, auto repair, welding,
horticulture, building trades, masonry, HVAC, and medical
technology, to address drug and alcohol addiction, and to resolve
psychological problems. 9 1 That such efforts do not have one
hundred percent success rates is not exactly surprising, nor is it
surprising that they have lower success rates than such simple
tasks as keeping prisoners confined or providing regular telephone
service.
Beyond the accuracy of the empirical evidence for the success
rates of rehabilitative programs, and beyond the question of the
standard against which such rates are to be measured, lies a more
basic question still: what is the purpose of gathering empirical
evidence of this nature? When social scientists evaluate
rehabilitative programs, they are not evaluating rehabilitation
itself as a social goal, because they are not comparing it to the
success rate of any other mode of punishment. Rather, they are
trying to determine how to achieve an acknowledged social goal in
an effective manner. The operative question in each study is not
whether rehabilitation is a good idea, but how we best achieve it.
This conceptual horizon exists because rehabilitation is the only
approach to the treatment of criminals that is institutionally
viable in our society. It is pointless to ask whether rehabilitation
is more effective in stopping recidivism than torture, exile,
servitude, or even shaming, because the choice among these
approaches is not open to empirical assessment. We are not going
to adopt them. There might be some point to asking whether
rehabilitation is more effective than incapacitation, since
incapacitation is clearly a morally acceptable strategy. But, as
indicated above, incapacitation does not address the question
being asked; it is too limited an idea to tell us anything about the
treatment of prisoners. A more valuable question is whether
prison is the best means of rehabilitation, or whether we would
91. See LIN, supra note 66, at 40. See generally THE AMERICAN PRISON, supra
note 1; CHOOSING CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS THAT WORK, supra note 87; EFFECTIVE
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT, supra note 87.
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achieve our accepted goal more effectively through boot camps,
house arrest, or day treatment. In other words, it is useful to ask
whether prison is the best means of rehabilitation, but not
whether rehabilitation is the best goal for prison. The choice of
rehabilitation for prisons cannot be addressed by empirical means
because it is pre-empirical; it is a basic moral choice that has
already been made. Empirical studies cannot demonstrate
whether we want prisons to rehabilitate any more than they can
demonstrate whether we want public schools to educate their
pupils. The basic goal is the conceptual horizon of the institution;
the operative question for research is how we achieve that goal.
This is not to suggest that rehabilitative programs are
beyond criticism. The real question is how we evaluate
rehabilitative programs and what conclusions we derive from
those evaluations. Rehabilitative programs should not be
evaluated against some fantasy-based standard that we can
rehabilitate every criminal, but against each other. What we want
to know is which strategies are the most effective, which ones
achieve relatively greater rates of success. When such research is
done, moreover, the answer will inevitably be the one that
researchers in the 1980s and 1990s suggested. There is no one
ideal rehabilitative strategy-that is another fantasy-but rather a
range of approaches whose effectiveness will vary with the
circumstances. These circumstances include the type of criminal,
the attitudes that he has developed, the type of community to
which he will return, the resources available in the prison, the
staffs general morale and existing skills with particular
rehabilitative programs, and the emergent features of the prison
as an institution.
That is in fact the approach adopted by prison wardens and
other correctional officials. Although far from being a collection of
bleeding heart liberals, they are uniformly committed to
rehabilitation as a goal for prisons. They recognize, however, that
this goal will often be frustrated, that many prisoners will turn
back to crime following their release. In their view, their job is to
make rehabilitative opportunities available, and to do their best to
alter the institutional variables to favor rehabilitation. The
remaining, and generally determinative variables, involve the
prisoners' own attitudes. This approach to rehabilitation, which
was decisively articulated by Norval Morris, 92 seems to be the
dominant one among prison officials. As Norman Carlson, director
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons stated: "All we can do is provide
92. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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opportunities for inmates who want to change." 93  But this
realization does not deter these officials from continuing the effort,
nor does it motivate them to search for different organizing
principles for their institutions. For them, as for society in
general, rehabilitation is the conceptual horizon.
There are a few exceptions, but their aberrance confirms the
general pattern. The first of these exceptions is death row.
Confinement there conforms fairly well to a pure model of
incapacitation, since the inmates are not expected to return to any
earthly society. These prisoners are given additional privileges,
such as their own television sets, for the express purpose of
keeping them quiet, and they are typically not provided with
opportunities for vocational or academic training. 94 Second are
jails, where the presumably innocent are being held until trial, or
where the convicted are serving short sentences. Here, the
inmates receive neither privileges nor opportunities, but the
incapacitative character of the institution is based upon the
premise that the inmates are there for relatively brief periods.95
The third, and perhaps the most dramatic exception are
supermaximum facilities, where the prisoners are kept in their
cells twenty-two or twenty-three hours a day, exercise in a cage,
and rarely interact with any other prisoner.96 For the most part,
there is one such facility in a correctional system. The most
common justification for these institutions is to remove the most
dangerous, disruptive, and incorrigible inmates from the general
population so that an atmosphere conducive to rehabilitation can
be maintained in the system's other facilities. But even in these
severest of our modern institutions, the rehabilitative ideal
sometimes reasserts itself. At Marion, the federal Level Six
facility that has served as a model for most other super-maximum
institutions, the Bureau of Prisons organized the institution along
rehabilitative lines, with the stated goal being to re-socialize the
93. PETE EARLY, THE HOT HOUSE: LIFE INSIDE LEAVENWORTH PRISON 58
(1992); see LIN, supra note 66, at 144 (describing the expectations and opportunities
of prisoners); GEORGE PLAYFAIR, THE PUNITIVE OBSESSION 212 (1971) (analyzing
English prisons).
94. For descriptions of death row, see BRUCE JACKSON & DIANE CHRISTIAN,
DEATH ROW (1980); ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN
EXECUTION PROCESS 33-66 (1990). For journalistic accounts of death row, see
generally KATY LEZIN, FINDING LIFE ON DEATH Row (1999); DAVID VON DREHLE,
AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD (1995).
95. See generally LINDA L. ZUPAN, JAILS: REFORM AND THE NEW GENERATION
PHILOSOPHY (1991).
96. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 42, at 128-43 (describing the Marion, Illinois
supermaximum facility).
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prisoners so that they could go back and lead a normal life in
general population at a Level Five federal facility.97
The second argument against rehabilitation is that it
authorizes an assault on the prisoner's personality. Critics charge
that the rehabilitative model is similar in concept, although not
necessarily in practice, to morally unacceptable reformative
techniques such as brainwashing, severe behavior modification,
drug therapy and shock treatment. It is also argued that the
model, at least in theory, would authorize open-ended sentences
that keep offenders incarcerated until prison authorities have
judged them to be rehabilitated. 98 C.S. Lewis was particularly
eloquent and exercised about this point.99 In the third volume of
his Christian science fiction trilogy, the head security officer of the
literally satanic National Institute of Co-ordinated Experiments
(N.I.C.E.), Miss "Fairy" Hardcastle, declares:
"You've got to get the ordinary man into the state in which he
says 'Sadism' automatically when he hears the word
Punishment." And then one would have carte blanche. Mark
did not immediately follow this. But the Fairy pointed out
that what had hampered every English police force up to date
was precisely the idea of deserved punishment. For desert
was always finite: you could do so much to the criminal and no
more. Remedial treatment, on the other hand, need have no
fixed limit; it could go on till it had effected a cure, and those
who were carrying it out would decide when that was. And if
cure were humane and desirable, how much more prevention?
Soon anyone who had ever been in the hands of the police at
all would come under the control of the N.I.C.E.; in the end,
every citizen. 100
The novel's explicit claim is that rehabilitation theory is the
tool of Satan. However, the more plausible conclusion that one
can reach from the story is that, in a country such as Great
Britain, it would require a takeover by Satan to turn rehabilitation
into an instrument of oppression. The same could be said about
Francis Allen's 1981 book, The Decline of Rehabilitative Ideal.
97. See id. at 141-42.
98. See ALLEN, supra note 1, at 41-57 (describing cultural differences in
rehabilitation); AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 39-40, 146
(1971); Ira Glasser, Prisoners of Benevolence: Power Versus Liberty in the Welfare
State, in DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE 97, 117 (Willard Gaylin et al.
eds., 1978) (stating the resistance of authorities to have limits placed upon their
discretion); MOORE, supra note 5, at 87 (examining different theories of
punishment); MORRIS, supra note 4, at 12-26 (describing different techniques of
rehabilitation). See generally SANSWEET, supra note 82.
99. See C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in FOUNDATIONS
OF CRIMINAL LAW 97 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999).
100. C.S. LEWIS, THAT HIDEOUS STRENGTH 81-82 (1946).
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Allen goes so far as to suggest that the most complete embodiment
of the rehabilitative ideal is to be found in the correctional system
of Communist China.101  The plausible conclusion from this
observation is not that we should abandon rehabilitation, but that
we should avoid a communist takeover because it would distort
our current correctional practices.
Once again, the problem with this criticism is that it fails to
state a theory for analysis or to establish an explicit metric. The
implied metric seems to be that a social program should be
condemned if any sort of government, no matter how different
than our own, could use it as a rationale for practices that we find
unacceptable. However, no program could withstand such a test.
Communist China used public education to indoctrinate its
children, 102 the Soviet Union used mental health to suppress
dissent, 10 3 and Nazi Germany used recreational programs to
foment aggressive attitudes. 10 4 These lugubrious examples may be
useful as a warning against potential abuses, but they cannot, by
themselves, be taken as a criticism of an otherwise acceptable
program. In one of his more considered moments, Allen states
that "the rehabilitative ideal has revealed itself in practice to be
particularly vulnerable to debasement and the serving of
unintended and unexpressed social ends."'1 5 While this is more
plausible than his comparison with Communist China, he has just
as little basis for asserting it. What does it mean to say that a
program is "particularly vulnerable to debasement"? Without
stating some standard for vulnerability of this sort, the statement
stands for nothing more than Allen's a priori decision to hold
rehabilitation accountable for every abuse committed by someone
who asserted a commitment to that principle. He has no evidence
that the principle caused the abuse, or made it in any way more
likely to occur.
In fact, the criticism of rehabilitation as an inducement to
abusive practices is almost certainly false when considered in the
context of American corrections. Rehabilitation has always been
101. See ALLEN, supra note 1, at 16-18.
102. See Fox BUTTERFIELD, CHINA: ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA 194-201 (1982);
JONATHAN SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 564-65 (1990). See generally
RICHARD BAUM & FREDRICK C. TEIWES, SSU-CH'ING: THE SOCIALIST EDUCATION
MOVEMENT OF 1962-1966 (1968).
103. See generally ZHORES A. MEDVEDEV & ROY A. MEDVEDEV, A QUESTION OF
MADNESS (Ellen de Kadt trans., 1971).
104. See WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 252-55
(1959). See generally H.W. KOCH, THE HITLER YOUTH: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENTS, 1922-1945 (1975).
105. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 34.
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the doctrine espoused by the most progressive elements in the
correctional establishment. The rigors of the Auburn and
Pennsylvania systems may seem excessive, but they were humane
when compared to torture or the death penalty. The rehabilitative
approaches that followed were generally more humane, and
expressed a sincere concern for the felon as an individual.
Pavlovian thought reform, although theoretically consistent with
the concept of rehabilitation, was never instituted to any
significant extent in American prisons, even when Pavlov's ideas
were very much in vogue. 10 6 If one wanted to catalogue the worst
abuses in American corrections, one would certainly choose the
convict leasing system and the plantation model prisons that were
the products of the servitude model. In contrast, when federal
courts decided to reform the South's plantation-inspired prisons,
they turned to the prevailing approaches to rehabilitation to
supply them with standards for a morally acceptable prison. 107
The claim that rehabilitation would authorize
indeterminately long sentences is equally a product of abstract
academic alarmism. It comes from the failure, already discussed,
to separate punishment itself from the mode of punishment, or
more precisely, sentencing from treatment. Rehabilitation has
rarely been used in this country as a principle for determining the
convict's sentence. The same holds true for incapacitation. For
the most part, sentences in this country are set without regard to
the mode of punishment, and are based on the nature of the crime
that the person has committed. American sentences use the
principle of just deserts, or, perhaps more often, rough
proportionality-the more serious the crime, in society's judgment,
the longer the sentence.10 8 In recent years, there has been some
106. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 42, at 268-70. American prisons did
experiment with some forms of behavioral conditioning. See, e.g., DIIULIO, supra
note 64, at 128-47; ROBERT HAWKINS & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, AMERICAN PRISON
SYSTEMS 413-16 (1989). See generally Willard Gaylin & Helen Blatte, Behavior
Modification in Prisons, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11 (1975). But these efforts were
relatively mild, and stopped far short of the kinds of abuses that the critics of
rehabilitation envision. A typical example of behavioral conditioning in American
prisons was the token economy, where the prisoners received tokens that they
could exchange for privileges when they exhibited the desired behaviors. See
generally Norman Carlson, Behavior Modification in the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
1 NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 155 (1974); Michael A. Milan & John M. McKee, The
Cellblock Token Economy: Token Reinforcement Procedures in a Maximum Security
Correctional Institution for Adult Male Felons, 9 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 253
(1976).
107. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 42, at 252-63.
108. The classic statement of this principle is HEGEL, supra note 33, at 66-73.
Kant subscribed to a similar view; the fact that these two adversaries agree on this
point gives it an impressive pedigree. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
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effort to consider rehabilitative possibilities when sentencing
certain offenders. However, this has not taken the form of
indeterminately long prison sentences, but of alternatives to
prison such as drug treatment or house arrest. The theoretical
possibility that a rehabilitative model might lead to long, open-
ended sentences, or of the fact that such sentences were imposed
in Communist China, has very little relevance to the actual
practice of corrections in the United States.
Even at a more theoretical level, the assertion that
rehabilitation ineluctably implies limitless and oppressive
treatment is unconvincing. It is based on the assumption that the
rehabilitative ideal is grounded in Pavlovian psychology and a
totalitarian mentality that we associate with the Soviet Union,
where Pavlov worked, and where his ideas were adopted with such
enthusiasm. But as described in Part I, the rehabilitative ideal
was the premise of the modern penitentiary, which means that it
pre-dates Pavlov and the Soviet Union by at least one hundred
years. 109 It was based on the ideas of universal citizenship,
individual rights, and personal development. Every person,
according to these ideas, has value, and even if they have
committed crimes, they should not be either discarded or used
purely as examples. Rather, an effort should be made to restore
them to their place in society and provide them with a fulfilling,
productive experience for the remainder of their lives. This view
leads directly to the kinds of programs that can be found in most
American prisons-to education, vocational training, drug and
alcohol treatment, and group therapy. It does not lead to
brainwashing, shock therapy, or open-ended sentences; these
means are incompatible with ideas of citizenship, individual rights
and personal development. The connection between such abuses
and the idea of rehabilitation, as it exists in Western society, is a
product of the overheated imaginations of the retributivists like
C.S. Lewis. It is neither logically implied nor culturally accurate.
Finally, critics of rehabilitation have argued that the entire
concept is inconsistent with our democratic principles, because it
subjects people to social engineering rather than treating them as
autonomous moral beings. A democratic regime, it is said,
depends upon the view that each person is equally valuable,
capable of decision making, and responsible for her actions. When
MORALS 104-09 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797). For a
contemporary discussion, see generally Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Aims,
Principles, and Politics, in FOUNDATIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 98, at 333.
109. See supra notes 10-36 and accompanying text.
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such people commit crimes, they should not become subjects for
manipulation by experts with supposedly superior knowledge.
They should be punished as moral actors who have chosen to
commit an offense against society. Rehabilitation is ultimately
based on a therapeutic, or psychological view of human beings,
rather than a moral and political view that is consistent with
democratic principles.
The difficulty with this criticism is that the societal reliance
on prisons as a mode of punishment and the societal commitment
to rehabilitation are essentially concurrent with the development
of English and American democracy. Historical evidence thus
suggests that rehabilitation and democracy are not as inconsistent
as the criticism claims. In fact, the view of individuals as
autonomous moral actors is common to all social contract theories,
including those positing that individuals must trade away all their
liberties to establish an effective government. It is as congenial to
an autocrat like Hobbes o10 as it is to a democrat like Rawls."'
Contemporary democracy, as we use the term, has nothing to do
with this; it is a social practice that chooses public officials by
election, and is based on the idea that the government's purpose is
to serve the people. 112 Rehabilitation fits perfectly well into this
democratic ethos. Its central purpose is that every human life is
valuable, and that government has an affirmative obligation to
help offenders return to society and live a normal and productive
life.
Conclusion
If one examines American scholarly literature on the subject
of selecting legislators and the chief executive, one will not find
much discussion of hereditary monarchy, autocracy, theocracy, or
aristocracy. All one will find is a discussion of the system of
elections that we have in place-how it currently functions and how
it can be improved. This is not the result of a lack of knowledge, a
failure of imagination, or a governmental prohibition of debate.
Rather, it results from the desire to say something relevant and
meaningful, to locate one's analysis within the framework of
politically possible and morally acceptable alternatives. For these
same reasons, scholarly discussion of prison design should focus on
110. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard E. Flathman & David
Johnston eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 1997) (1651).
111. See generally JOHN RAWIs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
112. See generally Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
711 (2001).
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the alternative means of rehabilitation. There are, of course, other
acceptable goals for punishment-general deterrence, special
deterrence, just deserts, and even retribution. None of these
alternatives, however, provides a rationale for using prison as
one's mode of punishment. There are also other punitive goals
that provide a rationale for prison, such as obtaining free labor or
inflicting continuous pain over prolonged periods of time, but these
are not politically possible or morally acceptable. Incapacitation
does fulfill these conditions and does provide a rationale for
imprisonment, but it provides no information about the way the
prison should be designed. It only tells us is that the prison
should be a prison, that is, a facility that incarcerates the offender.
The only rationale for the design of prison programs that is
possible and acceptable in this society is rehabilitation. It is time
to stop using attacks on this principle as a means of demonstrating
that one is tough on crime, angry about liberalism, or hard-headed
about prison management, and to focus on the difficult but
necessary task of finding ways to implement this obviously
desirable goal.

